= Inner dimensions of the Indonesian Revolution
=
Autonomous Histories; Particular Truths: Essays in Honor of John Smail, ed. Laurie J. Sears, CSEAS, U Wisconsin, Madison, 1993, pp. 219-243.
Paul Stange, CSASP, IKIP Malang
A passing of generations is in process and the transition has become rapid recently. However since the Indonesian declaration of independence in 1945 it is mainly those who came of age during the "revolution" who have dominated the nation. Privileged by their role in and rise through that collective rite of passage, the cohort that reached maturity then have been disproportionately influential since. As the youth of Anderson's "pemuda revolution" they helped shape events of that time; ever since their visions have had special power. Their influence has not been restricted to elite discourses; it has reached all levels of local, educational, cultural and religious life. In this respect the phase of military engagement and diplomatic transition, from August 1945 to December 1949, conventionally delineating "the revolution", marked the beginning of a cultural transition which is still contentious.
Studies of the Indonesian revolution have probed far beyond analysis of the politics of states and parties. Following lines opened up by John Smail's theoretical formulation, focusing on the importance of local history, and his thesis, on Bandung in the Early Revolution, excellent studies have probed local social movements rather than being restricted to focus on narratives of "national" events. In reviewing recent contributions in this vein Frederick suggests we have reached the end of this line of inquiry. He notes that informants, those who recall the revolution, are on record or dying off; that the major archival sources for the social history of the period have been tapped; and that theoretically the potential gains from this track have been made. In concluding he suggests that new perspectives may yet be opened through Annals styled and comparative work.
Social, economic and political domains usually retain center stage in local histories and they are shadowed by preoccupation with agendas of power. If popular visions are constrained by the perspective of "winners", local histories may focus overly on "losers" and both views tacitly reflect the same senses of power and purpose. Some sources on the Indonesian revolution provide glimpses of collective will and spiritual depths, but even amidst a cacophonous diversity of voices ordinary individuals rarely emerge. Issues of power submerge the everyday so that if the draught of 1945 overshadowed politics for villagers, that fact does not loom large in our vision of the time.
Here my aim is to highlight yet another dimension of ideas and practices intimately embedded in the revolutionary process, to supplement the array of perspectives already in view. This excursion works through local micro history and operates with ethnographic logic. In ethnography village studies have general relevance through the dynamics they bring into view. Similarly here the significance of this narrative does not rest on the national role of the actors alluded to. Assessment of the "importance" of Sumarah, the organization I treat, is not at issue. Sumarah perspectives on its wider role ought to be taken into account, but my accent is on the window the experiences of members opens to spiritual concerns within the revolutionary process. Such spiritual impulses were expressed not only through mystical, millenarian, and magical practices, superficially akin to Sumarah but equally through radical Islamic aspirations which, in subtle but important respects it also echoes.
Movements such as Sumarah are largely invisible, they do not appear in public records of events and they elude, by their nature even when not by intent, the eyes of recording authorities. Even local newspapers make only the most marginal mention of them and this may be so, as in the case of Sumarah, even when leading figures are also sometimes public names. In standard histories the people I am referring to are faceless, they are the "rural kyai" Dahm, Anderson, and Frederick refer to. Usually such movements are mentioned when speaking of rural erruptions into the urban political contexts of revolutionary struggle, especially in relation to the battle for Surabaya after the British landing in October 1945.
Sumarah orientations and visions
"Sumarah" is a Javanese meditation movement which originated in Yogyakarta, the same court city in central Java which housed the Republican government during the Indonesian national revolution. Like the "nation", Sumarah surfaced publicly in 1945 but only became established as a formal organisation in 1950. Like the nation, the meditation movement was conceived in the consciousness of the pre-war generation but birthed through the dynamism of revolutionary youth during the late 1940s. Sumarah origins lay in the experiences of older Javanese mystics from the generation which had matured by the end of World War I, the first wave of those who experienced Dutch education. It became organised through the same wave of pemuda activism which brought the nation into being.
During the revolutionary period the members of Sumarah felt and acted as one with that struggle. Although the ultimate aim of their practice lay beyond the material sphere, they found that in the process of working toward it they were led to commitment within revolutionary process. In their context it seemed natural that private experiences, even of meditation, were shaped by preoccupations they shared with others around them. The brotherhood they belonged to was also transformed in the process. Its membership jumped from around five hundred, as it stood during the Japanese occupation, to over three thousand in 1950; its composition was altered by an influx of youth and with them came new forms of organization. Even private spiritual practices within the group were geared directly to respond to the revolutionary situation.
The intensity and vitality of the revolution raised fundamental spiritual issues which remain of interest now. It is often thought, in Java as in the West, that mysticism results in an escapist mentality, that people are driven to it when "realities" are too intense to accept, that they take refuge in "irrational dreams" as a defence against intolerable conditions. To imagine that mystical practices decrease interest in and activity within the social world, that it is "other worldly" and "world rejecting", may be valid as a comment on some particular practices. Practices of "total surrender" or commitment to "harmonizing with natural process" are easily read as implying fatalism. But practitioners misread to this effect for the same reason rationalistic observers may: each begins with the premise that individuals are discrete and separate. However the principle underlying practices of mystical union is the opposite. Fundamentally conviction that "all is one" implies that each individual is integral within wider process and when that principle is realized in practice, the result is not disengagement from social process, but attunement and action harmonized within it.
Sumarah experience within the national revolution provide an opening to understanding. The revolutionary activities and inner experiences of its members interpenetrated. For them mysticism provided a practical and direct way of coping with intense realities, not irrational escapism. Meditation practice was a pathway to facing and acting meaningfully within the realities of a stressful time. Their spiritual experience was directed toward surrender and openness within and to the revolution, not to an abstracted "spiritual" construed as beyond the social events of their time. Even if these qualities of Sumarah may not be typical, in any case they caste light on a matter of principle relevant to consideration of mysticism as such.
The relationship between Sumarah origins and nationalism was fundamental rather than incidental. Sukino, the founder of the movement, described his nationalist aspiration as producing experience of revelation: his wahyu, as the spiritual revelation underpinning the movement was termed, came in response to a "prayer" for independence on September 8, 1935. Ever since then Sumarah members have associated their origins with nationalism even though the logic of that connection was not immediately clear. It was only during the revolution that the cry for freedom (merdeka) and call to total conviction (iman bulat) merged. Sukino's prayer, the one which immediately preceded his experience of revelation, had been addressed to the specific situation of Indonesian people; his revelation, the "answer" he was given, was explicitly directed to all humanity. On the one hand there is the obvious paradox of a spiritual teaching rising to meet an ostensibly political impulse; on the other that of a universal message coming in response to a parochial issue.
During the decade from 1935 to 1945 Sumarah activities reflected consistent nationalist preoccupation such as had become common among urban Dutch educated Javanese. Sumarah meetings were watched by colonial authorities. On one occasion a police informant attended a Yogya meeting but left in silence. Several times members were called in for questioning, especially about their practice of martial arts (pencak-silat), an adjunct to Sumarah as well as other practices. Sukino asked his followers to name him and make his personal responsibility clear so that he would be called in rather than others. Apparently the Dutch were satisfied, as inquiries at that point ended with the mild comment that Sumarah practice might be more appropriate for police than for the public. While no major incident is recorded, an atmosphere of suspicion existed.
Some suspicion would have been justified. Sukino's visions did result in increasing conviction that independence was imminent. The influence of and preoccupation with Dutch domination is recognized in Sumarah histories. One informant commented that in 1940 the first version of the Sumarah "vows", the Sesanggeman, which function as guiding principles for the group was vague and evasive. He linked that lack of clarity to the dampening atmosphere of colonialism, and suggested that clarity of consciousness and expression only became possible with independence. Preoccupation with independence was pervasive for those drawn to Sumarah, but no radical actions by members are recorded prior to the Japanese occupation.
Like many Javanese, Sukino envisioned the Japanese occupation during the late 1930s. At the time he interpreted his vision of the arrival of Japanese troops as indicating that they would join Sumarah and along with many others, he initially believed that the Japanese arrived as true liberators. Some of his friends, such as H. Soetadi in Surakarta, initially collaborated within the Japanese administration and in 1943 Sukino publicly urged young men to join Peta, the Japanese sponsored defence corps. While speaking at a celebration of Hari Raya Idul Fitri, marking the ending of the fast month of Ramadan, he suggested that the pemuda should join Peta in order to get military training as preparation for the establishment of a national army. One Sumarah youth who did join, Zahid Hussein, was the adopted son of Sukino's special secretary (penulis Hakiki), Bariunhartono. Zahid recalls having been summoned by Sukino, who related his earlier visions and stressed the significance of Zahid's responsibility.
Sukino and his friends gradually joined others who realized that the Japanese had no intention of honouring promises of independence. As that understanding grew during 1944, the senior Sumarah members in Yogya gathered to probe the reality of their situation. They met in the home of Prawiroatmodjo to meditate on the relationship between the Japanese occupation and Indonesian independence. After the collective meditation one of the group, Hardjogoeno, shared the vision he had experienced during their meditation. He described having seen a world map as though projected on a screen in the sky. On the map he saw the Japanese returning northward to their home. Sukino responded with conviction that the vision indicated that independence would follow Japanese military defeat--he then warned that Sumarah should keep its understanding secret, for obvious reasons. On the basis of this clarity, the collected elders (sesepuh) entered meditation on a second question: who would lead the free nation? They got the unequivocal answer: Sukarno.
Given the timing of these visions, there is nothing remarkable about their content. The Japanese were already in Manchuria when Sukino predicted their progress toward Indonesia; the Pacific war had begun to swing toward the Allies when the Yogya elders met in 1944; and Sukarno was already in a commanding position due to his pre-war following and occupation activities. It nevertheless bears reminder that such facts are never so self-evident as they appear in retrospect. In any case in each instance Sumarah members sought guidance and the authority of Hakiki , a spiritual guidance they believed came straight from God, rather than acting on calculated estimation of the situation. From their standpoint directing of questions to Hakiki meant effort to base action on attunement to the undercurrents of power which determine historical process, to act in accordance with the divine. Sumarah sources make clear that often the meaning of these visions only became clear in retrospect, so the fact that they are highlighted is not tied to belief in their literal predictive value.
Predictions (ramalan) are a common feature of the Javanist system. Tremendous attention used to be devoted to interpretation of primbon, calendrical almanacs which underpin Javanese "astrology". The Joyoboyo cycle, Ronggowarsito's predictions and other prophetic cycles resurface periodically in public awareness. Many Javanese still trust in contacts with spirits for information about the future. On the whole Sumarah members devote little attention to such issues; their practices are firmly oriented to the "present". Nevertheless Sumarah's founders apparently made conscious efforts to comprehend their historical moment as an element within a divine plan. Not satisfied to act on the basis of "reasoned interpretations", in effect, they aimed to tune to cosmic patterns and meanings, revealing conviction that past and future are woven into the present.
Sumarah members did act on the understandings received. Sukino wrote to Sukarno in December 1944 to inform him of the existence and nature of the brotherhood. He underlined the nationalist orientation of the group and asked for advice as to how it could best contribute to the struggle. Sukarno sent a postcard response, in April of 1945, urging Sumarah to organize itself as efficiently as possible. As a result the Sumarah leaders designated R. Sidarto, a young member, to lay the foundations of an organization. That effort in 1945 failed to produce results. It did, however, indicate a willingness within the association to adapt to changing circumstance. It is also notable that in those first days of the revolution Sumarah's founders already felt that the pemuda should be responsible for organizing.
Some young members were active in the months prior to declaration of independence. One Sumarah youth within Peta, Oemar Slamet, worked with friends to form an underground. They succeeded in taking several cases of ammunition from the Peta stockpiles in Bantul, to the west of Yogya, and reported them as stolen. Later Oemar Slamet became a leader within the pemuda upsurge to claim Yogya, in the days immediately following the proclamation. In those few days the context of national struggle was radically transformed, as the long period of suppressed waiting gave way to public organizing and physical conflict.
Wartime activities
Although its members were active individually and shared senses of what the revolution implied, "Sumarah" did not exist as an organization which could take formal positions on military or ideological issues. Some actions, especially those of the pemuda Sumarah in the Madiun area and the Barisan Berani Mati did involve collective activity related to Sumarah membership. For the most part Sumarah members participated as individuals, involving themselves in a spectrum of parties and activities. Given its politicized context, it is important to note that Sumarah managed to avoid being ideologically tagged. Leaders did, on the other hand, frequently and explicitly vocalize commitment to nationalism, and in this they implicitly seemed closest to the PNI. However locally, in the varied regions of its activity, members were as likely to identify with Masyumi, the leading Muslim party (which in this period included both Nadhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah styled Muslims).
Following the declaration of independence there were several months of increasing conflict, especially centering on the Allied reoccupation, under British auspices, of the port cities of Jakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya. Sumarah youth from Yogya joined in the fighting in Semarang; a more substantial group participated in the battle for Surabaya. In both cases popular military units (lasykar) were formed under Sumarah leadership and with substantially Sumarah composition. In Central Java the unit, a collection of squadrons in fact, as its units operated separately, became known as the Barisan Berani Mati, the corps of those "unafraid of death". In East Java the unit is sometimes referred to with the same name, but was more often known simply as "pemuda Sumarah".
According to one member of the Barisan Berani Mati, Wahyono Pinandaya in Yogyakarta, their brigade was part of Battalion 13 led by Bung Tomo and existed from July 1947 to April 1948. Its leader was Colonel Hasanuddin Pasopati, who coordinated units operating in Yogya, Solo, Wlingi and Madiun, and apart from Mostar, a well travelled sailor from Gresik, all its members were very young. Wahyono, a second year high school (SMA) student at the time, became a lieutenant in "A company", led by a school friend of his, Abuhassan, and they were active during the first clash against the Dutch in 1947.
From the perspective of the revolution as a whole these Sumarah units numbered among the countless irregular forces of the popular revolutionary army. Both were dissolved in 1948, with their members returning to civilian life. Only a few Sumarah members became active in the regular army and remained in the military after 1950. Among the latter was Zahid Hussein, the Peta trainee mentioned above. He eventually attained the rank of General and worked during the 1970s and 1980s in President Suharto's offices in Bina Graha, next door to the Presidential palace in Jakarta. In the same period he was one of the key national leaders of Sumarah and active in umbrella movements which aimed to take in all of the independent spiritual movements, in the SKK (Sekretariat Kerjasama Kepercayaan) and then HPK (Himpunan Penghayat Kepercayaan). Zahid Hussein is an exception however, as most Sumarah members participated in guerrilla units without becoming careerists in the military.
The character of the two Sumarah units differed somewhat. The Barisan Berani Mati included a number of ex-Peta leaders and became well known, even finding mention in a few Western histories of the revolution. It developed a reputation for honesty, meaning that its members were not generally guilty of private pillage--as characterized many lasykar activities. It also became very closely associated with Sudirman, the commander-in-chief of the regular army. The East Javanese unit led by Kyai Abdulhamid, a "perdikan kyai" from the village of Banjarsari, southeast of Madiun, remained more anonymous. His unit, "Barisan Pembrontakan Rakyat Indonesia", appeared to be one of the countless "Kyai led" units which responded to the calls of Bung Tomo during the battle of Surabaya. Although neither was politically affiliated, the Barisan Berani Mati was attuned to Sudirman's Javanist and populist stance while Abdulhamid's unit probably tended to empathize more with the traditionalist Islam of the NU. These inclinations reflected Sumarah's pre-revolutionary roots and the tone of the regions they rose from.
Little detail of their activities is available. Kyai Abdulhamid's group was most active during the fighting in Surabaya and continued to exist through 1948, but little mention is made of specific activities by any of my informants. The Barisan Berani Mati was active during the Dutch actions of 1947 and 1948. During the Madiun affair in 1948 one of its units operated in the Pacitan region; during the Dutch occupation of Yogya it was in the hills of the Gunung Kidul region along with Sudirman, the Commander in Chief of the Republican forces. Although both units were affiliated with Sumarah, neither took shape purely as a collectivity of Sumarah members.
According to Wahyono, Bariunhartono and other leading Sumarah figures regularly led meditation practice for his unit, but he remained unaware of its connection to Sumarah until after the unit had dissolved, when he joined Bariun's meditations back in Yogya. Another informant in Solo, later known in Kampong Sewu as a healer and medium, belonged to Kyai Abdulhamid's unit and received his spiritual initiation within it, yet remained unaware of its connection with Sumarah until 1972. Certainly many joined these units without prior knowledge of Sumarah. From their standpoint the units appeared mainly as mystically based guerrilla units, led by respected teachers who had the capacity to teach the martial arts--including their standard Javanist component of invulnerability (kekebalan). I will return to discussion of spiritual practices within these units later, but concentrate for the time being on the "external", physical, activities of Sumarah members.
Beyond the sphere of the two units which had Sumarah affiliation, individual founders were involved in a variety of ways. Several founders became unofficial spiritual advisers to military groups. Suhardo, a barber from Yogya and Sukino's first spiritual associate in the practice, lived in Bojonegoro during most of the period from 1945 to 1949. Although not leading a fighting unit, he became a key adviser for Colonel Sudirman (not the commander-in-chief, of the same name), the regional leader of the Republic's regular army. This Sudirman had been a close friend of Soetadi's in Solo and became involved with Suhardo through Soetadi, from Surakarta and another prewar founder of the movement.
Sudirman designated a junior officer named Sukardji as liaison between Suhardo and the regiment, he also provided Suhardo with an unlimited railway pass. Sukardji remained in the regular army until retirement as a Major in the late 1960s. He eventually consolidated a large Sumarah following in Gresik in the early 1960s and then became the leader of the Surabaya regional branch. In the 1970s he also became a driving force within the East Javanese SKK. Sudirman's contact with Suhardo thus had important by-products. Sukardji's contact, and especially the railway pass he and Suhardo had, facilitated contacts between the branches of the organization during the revolution and may account for the notable strength of Sumarah's following among railway officials and workers in the Nganjuk, Kertosono, and Jombang area during the 1950s. For his part, Suhardo drew on spiritual knowledge to advise Sudirman.
A somewhat different situation existed in Surakarta. Soetadi was not merely a spiritual adviser to activists, but himself also a politicized participant and a prominent figure within local prewar nationalism. Soetadi, who was born in 1894 and died in 1958, was a member of the Volksrad, the colonial parliament, from May 15, 1921 to June 30, 1931. In that context his speeches centered on working conditions for school teachers, reflecting the fact that he held his seat as a representative of the teachers union (he had taught in a Muhammadiyah school). He was more widely known through journalism. He edited newspapers including Neratja (Jakarta; January 1922 to December 1923), Darmo Kondo (Surakarta; from January 1929 to December 1935), Matahari (Semarang; January 1936 to March 1942) and Pemandangan (Jakarta; January 1938 to March 1942). Soetadi had also played a significant role in the Surakarta Insulande, apparently working to restrain Haji Misbach, in accord with kraton injunctions, in March 1918, but then quit during its annual meeting of December 1918. Subsequently he was a commissioner of Budi Oetomo's central committee during 1921.
There are no references to Soetadi in literature on the revolution, perhaps because he was most active during the time of greatest chaos, when the city's Republican government was in the Wonogiri hills. He played a role within the formation of a Republican government for the Solo region as a vocal member of the local PNI. Solonese process was more traumatic than the related Yogyanese transformation. In Yogya, where the Sultan initiated profound changes during the Japanese occupation, the Pakualaman accepted and followed the Sultan's lead and both became solid supporters of the Republic. As a result Yogya became a natural center for the revolutionary government and the traditional courts ironically retained their prestige and power precisely by being willing to surrender it. In Solo the Sunan was weaker, rivalled by the Mangkunegaraan, and both wavered in their response to the revolution. The city became a center of populist opposition to the diplomatic strategies of the Republican leaders in Yogya. As a result the formation of a new local government brought confusion.
Within the Solonese context Soetadi's PNI nationalism and his commitment to the Pancasila, the syncretic state philosophy as Sukarno formulated it, would have made him a moderate and he was implicitly alligned to the pamong praja, the rising Javanese/ Indonesian bureaucratic class through his association with Soediro, the Resident. Although politically active through the whole period of rapid turnovers in local government, his period of office came just at the point when it could not function. In late 1948 he became head of the city's economic office, just as the Dutch reoccupied the city. Leaving the city to the Dutch, Soetadi retreated with most of its Republican government to guerrilla centres in the hills near Wonogiri. While in the hills he organized intensive spiritual retreats and was frequently called on to "bless" the guerrilla forces as they prepared for battle. In doing so he would give them Sumarah's first initiation, though like Abdulhamid he never stressed its relationship to the brotherhood.
Soetadi's political activities bore the PNI rather than Sumarah label. Throughout the revolution he organized meditation sessions, geared to the struggle, to which he invited a wide range of mystics from beyond Sumarah. After the revolution, in a series of radio talks from 1950 to 1952, he spoke at length about the spiritual element within the revolution but without referring to his Sumarah identification. During the same period he was extremely active within Sumarah's organization, playing a leading role during the 1940s in planning organizational conferences and carrying on extensive correspondence. He instructed Sumarah members to meditate daily at sunrise and sunset, devoting themselves not only to self purification, but also to collective commitment to the revolution.
Soetadi's letters, even those with purely internal purposes, were headed by the exclamation "merdeka 100%", or "total freedom". Throughout the revolution he sent letters to local leaders (sesepuh) to arrange times for meditation and fasting. The aim was to designate moments so that the group could meditate collectively despite physical separation. Soetadi's letters underline the imperative and stress that every Indonesian had to be totally dedicated in spirit and body. In 1947 he designated Anggarakasih (Selasa Kliwon, January 28) and Mohammed's birthday (Senin Legi, 12 Mulud, February 3) for special fasting and intensive group meditation. In 1948 he suggested the same for the national celebration of May 20 (Hari Pergerakan Kebangsaan). In June of 1948 he circulated a letter asking all members to keep the Islamic fast month in the purest and fullest sense--of purifying the self spiritually. On these and other occasions he named times of Javanist, Islamic, or national significance; urging Sumarah members not only to keep the rituals others would follow, but to do so in fully spiritualized terms.
All through the revolution--and since for that matter--Sumarah followers have felt that collective meditations are a positive contribution to liberation and peace. Such co-ordination is seen as significant because it leads to a prismatic focusing of spiritual energies, a linking of human consciousness with the transcendent. That linking is viewed as an aid to activation of the divine within events. This sense of connection between spiritual and social spheres is shared by other mystical movements in Java as implicitly elsewhere, where it is reflected in religious patterns of directed prayer. From the Sumarah standpoint the relationship between meditation and events is even more clearly demonstrated by Sukino's experiences in 1947.
In mid-1947 the Dutch launched their first major effort to crush the Republic by force. The revolutionary forces suffered several major defeats and the Dutch were able to occupy all of Java except the Javanese ethnic heartland. They might have gone farther, except that their action resulted in an international wave of sympathy for the Republic, especially in strong pressures from the UN for the Dutch to accept a cease-fire. In August of 1947 Sukino wrote a letter describing his experience of the July crisis prior to UN intervention. On the evening of July 23 he went to the home of Sastrosudjono for a meditation with other Yogya leaders. Aside from the host only one other had come, and he left before Sukino got there because the others were absent. Sukino and Sastro meditated together and they spoke about the recent outbreak of fighting, casting about for understanding as to how it would be resolved. In meditation Sukino received guidance that he personally was to pray to God to bring resolution, that his prayer would be instrumental. He asked Sastro who would be responsible for ending the crisis, but Sastro's response was, "Sukarno". Sukino disagreed, saying that he had received a special instruction and had to return home to carry it out alone.
That night, between one and two in the morning, Sukino prayed in meditation until he felt the exercise sufficient. As he describes it, he "prayed to God [mohon kepada Allah Yang Maha Kuasa] so that the fighting could result in Indonesian victory, leaving the means entirely in God's power [penguasa Illahi]". Several days later, on July 30, Sukino made a rajah intended to effect Indonesian victory. A rajah is a piece of automatic writing, sometimes in words but often just as a pattern, infused with spiritual power. Javanese often use them within amulets designated for healing or invulnerability. In this case Sukino's followed clear commitment to leave not only the power, but also the details, in God's hands--distinguishing his rajah from others which are seen as drawing on personal or spirit powers. Nevertheless, Sukino clearly felt that there was a relationship between his actions and the process they were addressed to. He later noted in his version of Sumarah history that UN intervention followed his prayer and rajah, but makes clear that he made no causal claims while pointing to the conjunction.
As in the case of the collective and directed meditations of Sumarah as a whole, Sukino's experience suggests Sumarah conviction that their actions on the spiritual plane were fundamental to the revolution. To observers the connection can never be as clear as it is in the case of the pemuda who went to battle, but from within there was no doubt that such meditative activity was not just produced by, but also important to the struggle. Yet even while feeling the link between meditation and political events, Sumarah leaders (as distinct from young members) did not make instrumental or causal claims. Even at the time, Sukino's statements make clear that such causal issues could only be "resolved by God".
Sukino's wartime endeavours were not restricted to the subtle planes. Along with friends, he provided urban support for the guerilla movement. Sumarah was just one network among many, but in any case the group of friends shared a depth of trust which provided a solid ground for wartime co-operation. Among them was one Western trained doctor named Surono. Dr. Surono joined Sumarah in 1946 and was to become its organizational leader from 1950 to 1966. He came into contact with Sukino through Oemar Slamet, who he had met while they were both in Peta. During the revolution his clinic, located just east of the kraton and with a handy exit into dense kampong, became a dispensary for aid to guerrillas. For his part Sukino was continuously in contact with Soetadi and Suhardo, with regional centers of Sumarah, and of course with the Barisan Berani Mati and its leader Hasanuddin Pasopati. Although acting individually, Sumarah members experienced a bond which made the brotherhood a natural channel for revolutionary activity.
At one point Sukino was summoned by Sukarno for advice in a moment of crisis. He was called because of his contacts with guerrilla forces, not because Sukarno was seeking supernatural portents, as some non-Javanese observers may have felt. To outsiders Sukino would have appeared as one of the "dukun" who Sukarno looked to for esoteric guidance, but there are no indications of a special relationship between the two--even in sources prior to 1965. Sukarno looked to Sukino because it was known that he had strong contacts with General Sudirman, the army commander. According to his daughter Roestiyah, Sukino never met the general face-to-face, but there was a link through the Barisan Berani Mati, which appears to have been closely connected to Sudirman. There is no doubt that Sudirman's spiritual and Javanist sense of the revolution would have been the basis of a natural empathy with Sumarah. In August 1948 Sudirman attended the opening ceremony of Sumarah's first congress (suggesting they must have met). Then when the Dutch occupied Yogya in December Sukino took the responsibility of "protecting" Sudirman's wife and new-born son. These contacts indicate empathy, trust, and the existence of informal lines of communication.
Sri Sampoeno, for two decades the leader of the Surakarta branch after Soetadi's death in 1958, affirmed that he had seen Sudirman at the 1948 Sumarah congress in Yogyakarta. According to him Sudirman had suggested in that context that the movement should use the term "beatan" instead of "bukaan" for initiations. Wahyono also said Sudirman was there, but only as a VIP. He also commented that at the time politics was discussed, partly at the instigation of radical members from Madiun, who pushed forcefully for the formation of formal organization. The first Sumarah meeting, on August 29th 1948, nearly coincided with the Yogya congress of BKPRI (Badan Kongres Pemuda Republik Indonesia), held between August 24-28th. It is notable that the push toward organization was led by youth, especially from East Java, and that Soetadi, who some older members urged to keep on, also affirmed in letters that the youth should take over.
Those contacts may have been the reason for Sukarno's interest in Sukino. All through the revolution there were severe strains between political and guerrilla forces. The political leadership was continuously involved in diplomatic negotiation; the populist guerrillas resented any concessions. Those strains grew during 1948, leading to crisis in Solo and armed conflict in Madiun. Early in 1948 the government began attempting to rationalize the military, pressuring lasykar units to return to civilian life and demobilizing several divisions of the regular army. As both military commander and populist hero, Sudirman was at the center of the storm. Tensions were never more severe, nor communications weaker, than in the wake of the Roem-Royen agreement of May 1949. That agreement led to Dutch withdrawal from Yogya and the return of Republican government under Sukarno on July 13.
Although the political leaders had returned to Yogya, for a brief period it remained uncertain whether the guerrilla forces under Sudirman would accept the terms of the agreement. At that point R.M. Margono Djojohadikusumo suggested to the Interior Minister, Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, that Sukino would be able to inform them of Sudirman's attitude. When Sukino was called, he arrived along with Ibu Suyitno, one of the senior Sumarah women. Sukarno began by explaining that he had heard that Sudirman did not agree with the Roem-Royen agreement. Sukino responded that he was certain that Sudirman would agree once he received a full explanation of them. Sukarno explained that he was unable to give a full explanation, because Sudirman was so sick his doctors would not allow lengthy conversation. He then asked whether Sudirman would submit to a direct order. Sukino replied that he would--but did not go on to clarify that his confidence came from Hakiki rather than through communication with Sudirman.
The conversation continued for some time on other topics, during the course of which Sukino explained that all Sumarah members would definitely return to civilian life once fighting ended. He also assured Sukarno that the federal structure resulting from the peace talks would quickly give way to a unitary Republic. Then Sukarno asked whether, in view of the opposition, his own leadership would continue. Sukino affirmed that it would, going on to instruct Sukarno to carry out his duties freely and confidently, without uncertainty. Finally, Sukino gave a detailed description of the nature of Sumarah practice in relation to the revolution.
Shortly afterwards Sudirman and his guerrilla companions re-entered Yogya. Observers describe the march as powerfully emotive, as a more poignant and dramatic occasion than the earlier return of Sukarno's government. Throughout the Dutch occupation of Yogya the guerrilla forces had maintained intense pressure, contributing substantially to the force of Republican negotiators. During most of 1949 dissatisfaction with diplomacy ran high in the Yogya region; identification with the guerrillas was strong.
When the military engagements with the Dutch were firmly ended by the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, Indonesia entered a period of consolidation. Conflicts, even armed struggle, continued internally. The Westerling incident of January 1950 and the continuing activity of Darul Islam guerrillas in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh challenged the new state. At that point the Sumarah leadership felt compelled to contact the national government, which was in the process of shifting to its permanent center in Jakarta. They did so to assure it that Sumarah supported the Republic and was in no danger of becoming involved in separatist political activity.
This assurance was a reconfirmation of the "a-political" (in its terms) stance Sumarah aimed to adopt, a neutrality which does appear to have passed the test of the Madiun affair in 1948. At that point tension between communist and populist and Islamic Republican forces were translated into civil war. Sumarah members from Madiun, where the outbreak centered, suggested that most of the killings were matters of grudge retribution rather than ideology, but in any case the severity of polarisation was a crucial test of Sumarah neutrality. Individually members in the area belonged to the full spectrum of political groupings; as a group Sumarah adopted a low profile and remained apparently untouched in the midst of devastating slaughter. A Madiun membership list compiled in February, six months prior to the outbreak, did list political affiliations. None of the two dozen pamong and sepuh listed any preference and only half of the other two hundred members listed did. Of those half listed the right leaning Masyumi (including NU); about one-third identified with the political center (PNI and Partai Sosialis); and a smattering belonged to the left-wing (Sarekat Rakyat, PKI, BTI). Sumarah membership neither determined nor corresponded with political affiliation.
The revolution brought Sumarah closer to public consciousness and led a large number of young men to join. Although many of them left when the fighting stopped, a substantial proportion of the pemuda who remained have since become leaders of the association. In the revolutionary period they had already initiated moves toward organization; since 1950 they have led it. These pemuda became the second generation of Sumarah membership. Most of the founding generation had entered during the colonial era, the leaders among them had been mature and experienced in mystical practice even prior to their contact with Sumarah. Most of the pemuda entered during wartime, as young men (and women, though fewer of them) without much background in mystical practice. Naturally these contrasts in grounding and context resulted in different experiences of Sumarah practice.
Spiritual freedom
It is frequently noted in the literature on Indonesia, and on mysticism in general, that periods of crisis generate a renewal of spiritual motivations. In interpretations of this pattern contemporary historians tend to emphasize the negative, explaining such interest as a consequence of physical or psychological deprivation. There is a validity to the correlations these interpreters point to, but often little comprehension of its meaning to participants. Times of crisis, whether at the individual or collective level, definitely generate intensified quest for meaning. Radical changes may serve to eliminate the socio-cultural "crutches" which sustain the complacency of normal everyday life. When communal structures disintegrate there is increasing consciousness of the need for structured relationships, a need which is sometimes met by membership in voluntary associations such as Sumarah.
There is no doubt that many Javanese looked to Sumarah, as to other kebatinan sects, not only for meaning and consciousness, but also for protection (pelindung) and safety (slamet). Many joined in search of invulnerability and others in a quest for healing, according to their own testimonies. The motivations driving people toward Sumarah are one thing; what Sumarah offered was another. Interplay between the two resulted in either withdrawal of the individual, or in the transmutation of motives. A wide variety of mainly materialistic motives may impel people toward spiritual movements, but a process of natural selection determines which will stick with them. Sumarah did offer brotherhood and the companionship of mature people rooted in conviction, it offered contact with people securely connected to meaning in life. Yet even the most cursory encounter makes clear that Sumarah's brotherhood is in silence. Anyone looking for action and external support would find little comfort in intense silence and introspection. Of those who came to Sumarah with instrumental motives, only a minority responded by joining in realization of a classic paradox: the fruits sought by desires are only offered to those who give them up.
The physical deprivations of the occupation years and the psychic traumas of revolutionary transition affected many people in the way ascetic practices also often do. Beyond those, however, fighting during the revolution raised the ultimate confrontation with death, bringing that spectre into the present. Nothing raises questions of meaning so intensely as the prospect of immediate annihilation. Impelled by a sense of destiny and convinced that external resistance required physical struggle, the pemuda faced that prospect often. All odds of logic defied their actions. Largely lacking arms, they sometimes entered battle as a ragged and untrained mass clutching bamboo spears (bambu runcing)--a romantic image which is extremely prominent in the memory of survivors. Some observers interpreted their Islamic cries as indication of irrational fanaticism, of fervor beyond reason. Here it is enough to note that the situation appeared irresistible and the prospect of death imminent. However there is no need to "explain" why, to probe the social context here, as my aim is rather to examine related spiritual experiences within Sumarah.
The pemuda entered into the same Sumarah system which had been established prior to the revolution. Within Sumarah this was still the "first phase" (a terminology they employ) of spiritual practice, and the second did not begin until 1949 when the fighting stopped. Basically there were two levels of practice, and by implication consciousness: kanoman and kasepuhan. Prospective members also went through a period as candidates (pemagang) before receiving the first initiation. The waiting period was prescribed to ensure that initiates genuinely knew (and wanted) what they were getting into, also so that the group could be confident of serious intentions. "Kanoman" and "kasepuhan" are literally simply Javanese words for the periods of youth and maturity. Within the context of kraton culture those terms already resonated with distinct styles and phases of spiritual practice. Traditionally it was well established that young men practiced physical and martial arts; their elders more intensive and silent meditation. Both were viewed as spiritual, but the folklore twined within tradition held that the desires of youth are too powerful to make the inward journey safe.
Although this traditional understanding applied within Sumarah, it is important to note that reference was to "spiritual" rather than "physical" age. It was quite often accepted that some people, although physically young, might be mature in spirit. A number of the pemuda in Sumarah, including Arymurthy, then a young man in Magelang and subsequently, from 1966 until the mid 1980s the leader of the movement, were initiated immediately into kasepuhan. By the end of the revolution there were a large number of pamong who could initiate members into kanoman, but very few who could take the responsibility for kasepuhan initiation. Only Sukino, Suhardo, Soetadi, Sukeno, and one or two others had recognized authority to supervise the higher initiation.
At some risk of simplification, it is possible to associate the two initiations (beatan) with power and consciousness. The first referred to a witnessing, by the guide, pamong, responsible, of the movement of God's power within the initiate. For candidates this meant the point of conscious recognition of an indwelling power beyond ego. In terms of Sumarah's sense of levels of awareness it meant the point at which the body was physically relaxed, thoughts were still, and senses passive. The kanoman practices which followed were interpreted as cleansing of subconscious karmic blocks. The next initiation referred to the point at which desires relaxed, resulting in internal witnessing of the meditative process. In contemporary Sumarah terms the first stage is simply preparation of the body and the second is the beginning of true meditation.
Kanoman exercise took three principal forms: karaga, meaning automatic movement; karasa, meaning sensitizing of intuition; and kasuara, meaning spontaneous speech. The three manifestations are woven into the richly symbolic metaphysical psychology of the Javanese. They relate directly to: the genital, heart, and head centers (known as the trimurti); to higher intelligence (budi), intuition (rasa), and memory (angen-angen); to Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva; and to the cakras within kundalini yoga. Like the terms kanoman and kasepuhan, the forms Sumarah experience took are established within Javanese mystical tradition. Most often, however, traditional exercises were related to spirit powers and trance states. Sumarah members who experienced these practices insist that they retained full self-consciousness, that although surrendering to an expression beyond ego control or capacity they were neither contacting spirits nor entering trance.
Much of what individuals experienced came in the form of releasing pent up energy or activating aspects of awareness which had been suppressed. Pranyoto, later one of the national leaders and an administrator within the Forestry Department, describes having experienced himself as a crocodile, "realizing his animal nature". Others describe bursting into song in foreign languages, dancing traditional forms they had never learned formally, and of course many found themselves fluidly practicing pencak-silat. Every individual's experience varied, each reflecting different lessons or karmic pathways. Exercises took place in a group, usually at the home of a guide in the cities, but often within intensive retreats in the guerrilla centres such as Kyai Abdulhamid's home outside Madiun. Often practice was directed toward activation of particular skills. Exercise of intuitive feeling (rasa) sometimes took the form of finding articles that had been hidden. Development of rasa was emphasized so that beginners could grow to distinguish the vibrations received from feelings emerging from within. The revolutionary setting produced special emphasis on martial arts. Whatever the form all of the kanoman practices were seen as leading to purification and increasing sensitivity to and awareness of power beyond ego--specifically God working within.
The system of guidance throughout this first phase of Sumarah was characterized by what Sumarah practitioners have referred to since as "nyemak". This meant that guides tuned in to other people's meditation and then directly informed them of blockages or errors. The guide might "see" that a person was experiencing tightness around the neck, active thoughts, or a "narrowed concentration" rather than "relaxed opening" attitude. Realizing the "problem", the guide would instruct the person to relax, shift the center of attention, or whatever was appropriate. Recently it is more common for guides to simply verbalize what they experience, leaving it to each person to realize which comments are relevant. Several men who were junior pamong during the late 1940s have told me that they could function as guides then, but were not themselves clearly aware of the dynamics of the process. It was only with the second, and especially the third phases of Sumarah development, during the 1950s and 1960s, that mental consciousness balanced action even in the performance of guides. During the first phase only a few senior guides comprehended the endpoint and contours of the process they were guiding people through.
This limitation in the extent of understanding within the practice was demonstrated by the "shift of centers" which took place in early 1946. In guiding kanoman exercises the youth were instructed to stand, relax, direct attention inward, and surrender to God. At the same point the guides tuned in both to the sphere of the group and to the inner center appropriate to it. The leading guides were fully aware of the functions of the seven occult centres known as cakra in yogic tradition and lataif by Sufis. The seven centres are a refinement of the three, identified above as the trimurti. It is understood that each center has a specific function--when activated it leads to specific powers. Up to 1945 Sumarah guides of kanoman practice centered their own awareness in the lowest cakra, the locus of kundalini or divine life energy within the microcosm.
As the leader of Sumarah youth in the battle of Surabaya, Kyai Abdulhamid rapidly found that this focus indeed produced bravery and willingness to fight. In fact some pemuda became foolhardy and there were more deaths than necessary. In early 1946 Sukino contacted the pinisepuh and Abdulhamid and called them to a conference in Solo. He informed them that he had received an instruction (dawuh) clarifying that they should shift their awareness from the first to the third cakra (from the base of the spine to the navel). The message was communicated to all pamong involved in guiding kanoman. As a result Sumarah fighters were able not only to devote themselves to battle, but also to survive.
The significance of the shifting of centers was manifold. It indicated a shift not only of individual, but also of group consciousness. Kanoman practices involve centering on the first three cakras; kasepuhan meant centering on the heart. Progression through the centers is understood within Sumarah as involving increasing degrees of consciousness, each higher center subsuming those below. As a spiritual brotherhood Sumarah has not experienced itself just as a collection of individuals of differing consciousness. It is that, but it experiences itself equally as having a collective consciousness. Just as individuals are seen as progressing through degrees of realization, the group has viewed itself as moving through the same process. Collective process of this sort may be inaccessible to outsiders, but belief in it can be noted as a feature of Sumarah member's internal vision of their own history.
While centering on the first cakra brought surrender to the movement of divine power, shift to the third was seen as bringing invulnerability. Both power and invulnerability (kekebalan) are easily misunderstood. Dozens of Sumarah members described their experiences to me and all the internal histories of Sumarah mention such experiences. Yet it has never been suggested that invulnerability meant capacity to stand with impunity in front of a machine gun. The powers touched by kanoman practice are said instead mainly to explain the paradox of total involvement in raging battle and the miracle of survival. The stories emphasize the "amazing", but not "magical" quality of experience. The official Sumarah history of the 1970s states only that experiences were extremely varied, that the value of practice was seen as demonstrated through the fact that the youth fought hard and returned home.
A Solonese informant who fought under Kyai Abdulhamid described amazement that, though he found himself boxed into impossible situations and trapped by hailing bullets, he survived. Dr. Surono, in his written version of Sumarah history, comments on the fact that people were impressed when a Sumarah pemuda returned from Surabaya--clothes ripped to shreds by bullets, but untouched. Surono's own experience was strongest when he was arrested by the Dutch, who suspected the truth--that he was providing medical aid to guerrillas. Feeling trapped, he felt compelled to simply surrender to God, finding to his relief that the interrogation went his way. In these reports it was consistently the fact of survival and safety in extremely dangerous conditions which was emphasized.
Zahid Hussein, already mentioned, related his experiences to me in depth. He described how every intense battle provoked a profound prayer for peace and complete surrender to God. Each time resolution came, but he did not feel personally responsible for it. Once he was involved during heavy fighting on the coastal highway outside Semarang. The battle had begun at daybreak and continued to mid-afternoon. At that point a renewed wave of planes began diving to strafe the guerrilla position. Utterly consumed by "a powerful feeling", Zahid lay down in the road asking God if it had not been enough. Immediately fighting stopped.
Later, during 1948, he was on patrol in Kulon Progo, outside Dutch occupied Yogya. While walking across rice paddies between two hamlets he found himself unexpectedly without cover and in front of a Dutch patrol. His friends were hidden among houses several hundred yards away and he was completely vulnerable. Zahid wrestled with the tension between fear and surrender, but as the situation appeared hopeless he gave himself up for lost, surrendering to God. He continued walking in front of the Dutch patrol until he neared the protection of his friends. As physical support neared his trust evaporated and finally he broke into a run for cover--just as the shooting began. When Zahid checked his experience with a pamong later on he was told that while in surrender he had been invisible, but when he faltered the God-given sphere had left him.
Another career officer, Sukardji, credits Sumarah practice not only for survival against the odds, but also for the fact that he never had to kill anyone. Sukardji was involved in front line combat during the revolution and reports that during the tensions after the 1965 coup he was on a PKI death list. Yet somehow he was able to perform his duties without having to kill. While such statements appear paradoxical, they highlight elements of the teachings received by Sumarah youth.
Sumarah guides emphasized not only that the guerrillas should commit themselves totally to the struggle and surrender the results entirely to God, but also that they should not hate their enemies or engage in looting and hoarding. Within the revolution many units did undercut collective effort by concern for personal wellbeing. Circumstances made that natural. Within Sumarah, as also in other spiritual circles during the revolution, it was stressed that whatever was won should be for the nation rather than the individual or even the unit. Pemuda were instructed to completely surrender both their own life and the results of battle to God.
Invulnerability then, was the product not of personal power, but of complete willingness to die. The practice, as understood by those teaching it, involved complete submission of ego rather than defence of it. Emphasis on God was reflected in the cries of "Allah Akbar" as Kyai Abdulhamid marched from his village retreat and around Madiun on the way to battle. It was reflected in another way when Sukino, quite early in the revolution, patiently explained to several enthusiastic youth that there was no need to enlist armies of ancestral spirits. When the pemuda told him they had been doing so, Sukino responded that his business was to guide people toward purity, spirits had "other business" to attend to, and anyway God's power was total--trusting and submitting to it was the way to Indonesian independence.
The capstone to Sumarah experience of the revolution, the practice closest to the heart of the process, was sujud perjuangan, literally meaning "surrender to the struggle". This practice was most forcefully articulated by a pemuda---not by the older generation of founding members. The practice was clarified most through the solid character of Joyosukarto, then a young man in the Magelang branch of Sumarah. Joyosukarto, a tailor, has since been among the leaders of the Magelang regional center, but in 1947 he was a fresh initiate. The practice of sujud perjuangan came to him through Hakiki during the course of his personal effort to relate meditation to his own particularly intense nationalism.
When the experience of Hakiki came to him his friends scoffed at the notion that such a recent initiate could claim knowledge of Truth. Others objected to suggestion that meditation had any relation to revolution. But when Joyosukarto consulted Sukino, the founder confirmed the authenticity of his experience, saying at the same time that only those feeling drawn to sujud perjuangan would need to do it. As Arymurthy later on pointed out, this early acknowledgment foreshadowed what many came to see as a key to the later evolution of Sumarah. One reflection of the collective growth in consciousness has been the fact that awareness of Hakiki, the ultimate authority at the root of Sumarah, has spread. As the movement developed and its members matured, increasingly individuals find the baseline of revealed Truth internally--rather than looking to the authority of the founders. From Sumarah's perspective, it was not only sujud perjuangan that contributed to clarity, but also the way it came, as on both counts it reveals dimensions of the revolutionary process.
Joyosukarto describes sujud perjuangan as a standing meditation in which the individual consciously attunes not only to personal cleansing, but also to the social process. Through that attunement, realisation grows that total surrender to God implies total attunement to the cosmos, surrender within rather than apart from the struggles of life. Joyosukarto underlines that surrender never comes mixed with requests for results (whether personal fortune or national independence). Ulterior motives preclude surrender. He also stresses that total surrender precludes dependence on others--that at root individuals have no choice but to learn on their own. For him there was (and is) no doubt about a total interpenetration of historical process and spiritual liberation.
In this sense Joyosukarto's reception of Hakiki provided explicit clarification of the link between Sukino's prayer for independence and the revelation of Sumarah. For Joyo the national process intrinsically requires release of the latent Indonesian identity, it demands "honest growth and expression of the self rather than imitation of an assortment of outside cultures". Completion of the revolution, in his terms, was meant to lead to free establishment of "internal and autonomous" cultural identity, recognition of an Indonesian national "being" as an entity on its own.
At the same time his message was that realization of the microcosmic spiritual quest is identical to total integration within the macrocosm of social process. Between nations there is imperialism and power struggle; internally there is an imperialism through which the ego suppresses the spirit, forcing the body to worship the mind as king. Just as the outer revolution requires painful elimination of repressive forces, the inner liberation requires an awakening of the spirit and transmutation of the mind. Joyo's formulation pronounced that the internal and external revolutions are one and the same--only appearing, through the trick called ego, to be separate. His formulation of the practice brought the meaning of Sumarah's revelation, especially its connection to the wider process of the national revolution, one step closer to the surface of its members' awareness.
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